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A different vision for U.S. foreign policy

A different vision for U.S. foreign policy

The Stimson Center’s Christopher Preble details a realistic and restrained approach to world affairs.

Globe creating a shadow of America.

Whether it is Ukraine, the Middle East, or debating NATO’s expansion, policymakers are asking: What role should the United States play in an increasingly complex world?

For decades, American foreign policy has often operated under the assumption that keeping the nation safe requires maintaining a dominant global presence. But many scholars and policymakers believe that approach has stretched America’s commitments beyond its core national interests — unintentionally undermining its security.

Stand Together spoke with Christopher Preble, senior fellow and director of the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center — a research and policy organization focused on nonpartisan solutions to global challenges.

Preble explained how a foreign policy rooted in realism and restraint could help the United States more effectively advance its core national interests while avoiding unnecessary entanglements abroad.

Stand Together: What do realism and restraint mean in the context of foreign policy?

Christopher Preble: Realism holds that there is no global governing authority, so countries must provide for their own security.

Restraint, in many ways, is unique to the U.S. We’re already secure because of our geography, friendly neighbors, strong military capabilities, and nuclear weapons that deter attacks. That means we should be highly selective about when and where we use military force: in service of our national interests and as a last resort.

What are America’s core national interests?

Our core interests are the defense of the security, prosperity, and independence of the American people and system of government. These are important because they’re a specific set of objectives, and without them, we have nothing.

Some people support a more ambitious set of objectives, but I believe two things happen if we do that:

1) We take those core objectives for granted and believe that we’ll be secure and prosperous no matter what we do, and

2) We attach an additional set of criteria that also become essential to our freedom and prosperity, such as making the rest of the world more liberal or free market-oriented.

But we can keep our country safe without making the world more like us.

Christopher Preble, senior fellow and director of the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center. Christopher Preble.

We can keep our country safe without making the world more like us.

Christopher Preble

Senior fellow and director of the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center

How would you describe the United States’ foreign policy approach in recent years?

Critics of post-Cold War foreign policy strategies argue that diplomatic approaches have been de-emphasized, while American military commitments have expanded far beyond a set of narrowly defined national interests.

Instead, hegemony — the perception that the U.S. must dominate the international system to be secure — has become the prevailing approach.

On one side, there is liberal hegemony — the belief that the U.S. should dominate to advance democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Illiberal hegemony, on the other hand, prioritizes self-interest, nationalism, and the retention of military and economic power.

Both miss the mark. Liberal hegemony tries to do too many things that engender resistance. We also don’t have the resources to sustain these efforts.

Illiberal hegemony breeds resentment because we disregard the interests of others — and that ultimately undermines our security.

Was there a turning point when U.S. foreign policy adopted this approach?

The end of the Cold War in the early ’90s was a pivotal moment. We emerged with a triumphant sense that we could accomplish anything — and that there were no limits on that ability.

As a result, we took military action in service of objectives beyond just security, starting with the Gulf War in 1991. We deployed the military there without a great loss of lives — at least relative to other wars. There were several other interventions, including threats to intervene in Haiti and involvement in Yugoslavia and Kosovo, that set us on this path.

The United States

has around 55 to 60 different security commitments.

The most well-known is NATO, which is an alliance whose essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members.

How could realism and restraint help the U.S. better navigate international relations, rather than relying on alliances such as NATO?

It starts with recognizing that other countries are empowered, capable actors defending their own interests. We need to take that seriously and not dictate how they should protect themselves. When we don’t, we end up in alliances that become the motivating factor rather than our own interests.

The U.S. has around 55 to 60 different security commitments, but the most well-known is NATO. In my view, the post-Cold War expansion of NATO inadvertently created two challenges:

1) It extended security guarantees to countries we were unlikely to actually defend with military force, and

 2) It heightened Russian insecurity by moving NATO infrastructure closer to their borders.

This is known as the “security dilemma” — where one country’s defensive actions are perceived as threatening by another, potentially unintentionally escalating tensions.

A more realistic approach would require policymakers to consider how adversaries perceive U.S. actions and how that affects our security.

A key part of a restrained and realistic foreign policy approach is restoring Congress’s constitutional role in decisions of war and peace. Why is this important?

In addition to focusing on diplomacy and a narrowly defined set of core national interests, a restrained foreign policy should raise questions about who has the authority to decide when the U.S. goes to war.

The Constitution tells us that the president’s sole authority with respect to the use of force is to repel sudden attacks against the United States in the event of an imminent danger. So when it’s not an immediate threat, and the U.S. goes to war, it’s incumbent upon Congress to approve that decision.

But after the creation of a permanent, standing military after World War II, we developed a mentality of always being ready for war that has eroded the balance between Congress and the president. That has made military action easier politically.

Critics of restraint might argue that reducing U.S. commitments abroad could create power vacuums and embolden adversarial actors, such as China and Russia. On the other hand, supporters counter that overextension itself can undermine our long-term security by increasing the likelihood that we’ll get involved in conflicts that aren’t vital to our national security, breed global animosity, or make enemies of countries we don’t need to fight.

Congressional oversight can help us make more measured and thoughtful decisions that are aligned with our national interests.

If the U.S. were to successfully shift toward a foreign policy grounded in realism and restraint, what would success look like?

Success would not necessarily be visible in dramatic global victories, but rather in avoiding unnecessary wars in the first place.

Going to war requires trade-offs — for both the government and the American people. If we use the military over here, it’s not available elsewhere. And resources are diverted from more effective uses that contribute to long-term fiscal stability, innovation, and human flourishing.

An approach grounded in realism and restraint lends itself to a vigorous debate when the president is contemplating the use of force: What vital national interest is being advanced? What is the military objective? How will we end the war? Have we exhausted diplomatic channels?

When we ask these questions, realism and restraint can lead to success. We won’t win every fight, of course, but it would lead to a more disciplined, sustainable, and constitutionally grounded foreign policy — one that truly keeps the U.S. safe and secure.

Christopher Preble is the senior fellow and director of the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center and cohost of the “Net Assessment” podcast. In his role, he leads a team of scholars who challenge prevailing assumptions surrounding U.S. foreign policy and offer a range of policy options that go beyond the use of force and coercion.

The Stimson Center is supported by Stand Together Trust, which provides funding and strategic capabilities to innovators, scholars, and social entrepreneurs to develop new and better ways to tackle America’s biggest problems.

Learn more about Stand Together’s foreign policy efforts and explore ways you can partner with us.

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